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              Abstract 
 
    This paper explores, using panel data of Japan, whether automobile 
inspections help to reduce accidents.  Two innovations introduced by this paper 
are the control of endogeneity by the 2sls fixed effects model and the taking into 
account of norm enforcement in order to control the omitted variable bias.  We 
found through this estimation that automobile inspections and the enforcing of 
social norms play a critical role in reducing fatalities but not non-fatal accidents. 
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Automobile Safety Inspections and Enforcing Norms: 




    Numerous empirical analyses have been compiled regarding regulations for 
automobile safety and their effectiveness.  For instance, the study of the impact 
of automobile inspections on the reduction of automobile accidents and fatality 
rates has drawn the attention of many researchers.  Peltzman (1975) argued that 
drivers drive more dangerously to offset some or all of the mandated safety.  
Garbacs and Kelly (1987), Garbacs (1990), and Merrel et al. (1999) found that 
safety inspections failed to reduce accidents, thereby supporting Peltzman‟s 
offsetting behavior hypothesis.  Contrary to these studies, Loeb and Gilad (1984) 
and Loeb (1985, 1987, 1988, and 1990) found inspections to be effective in 
reducing vehicle fatalities.   
Nonetheless, most of these studies, with the exception of Merrel et al.(1999), 
have not allowed for state-specific effects and are therefore vulnerable to omitted 
variable bias1.  Additionally, it is likely that prefectures in which fatalities 
increase will more severely mandate their drivers to get inspections.  The 
existing studies also made no efforts to control for the potential existence of 
endogeneity between safety inspections and automobile accidents.  Hence, in 
                                                   
1 Loeb and Gilad (1984), Loeb (1990), and Garbacz and Kelly (1987) use 
state-specific time series data. Loeb (1985, 1987, and 1988) uses cross-sectional 
data. Although Grabacz (1990) uses both time series and cross-sectional data, 
panel data was not used.  
order to control for unobserved state-specific fixed effects as well as endogeneity, 
in this study we estimate the fixed effects 2sls model by using the panel data from 
46 prefectures in Japan for the years 1988-2000 (Baltagi, 2005)2.  Thus, one of 
the innovations introduced in this paper is the control of the endogeneity of 
inspection. 
If an alcoholic, drunk driver drives along a road and kills a child, he knows 
that his neighbors will look down on him and that his employer will discover that 
he is an alcoholic.  In the long run, the entire community will come to ostracize 
this driver (Posner and Rasmusen, 1999).  Such a sanction is considered to be the 
cost of committing a crime (Funk, 2005).  The higher the cost, the stronger the 
social norm “not to commit a crime” becomes.  Therefore, the strength of the 
relative social norms plays a critical role in deterring drivers from driving 
dangerously.  We believe that social norms are the key determinant the attitude 
of driver.  This is why in this study we pay particular attention to the role of 
social norms in the regulation of drivers‟ manners and thus include the proxy 
variables of social disorganization.   
Even if a community is tightly-knit and social norms are strong, if an 
accident is not serious, then the cost of committing the crime is likely to be low.  
Consequently, we postulate the hypothesis that the cost of committing a crime 
depends upon the extent of the accident.  In this study we examine this 
hypothesis by estimating the determinants of fatalities and nonfatal accidents 
separately and comparing the results.  
                                                   
2 Japan consists of 47 prefectures.  We could not obtain the per capita 
consumption data of all types of alcoholic drinks for Okinawa Prefecture, however, 
and thus only the data for the other 46 prefectures was used.  
 II. MODEL 
     Figure 1 (a) and (b) report the number of non-fatal and fatal accidents, 
respectively. We see from Figure 1 (a) and (b) that non-fatal accidents rise 
consistently, which is in contrast to fatalities, which gradually decline after 1990.  
Figure 2 depicts the time trends of the real revenue of the Japanese automobile 
inspection industry. Figure 2 shows that there has been an immediate increase in 
revenue in recent years.  Our conjecture from these observations is that safety 
inspections increase non-fatal accidents but decrease fatal ones. 
     Following the argument in the previous section, the estimated function 
takes the following form: 
FATAL ( or ACCI ) =  α 1 INSPit  + α 2BOOZEit  + α 3 DENSit  +α 4 
DISORG1 it  
+α5 DISORG2 it +α6 YOUG it +α7 POLICEit +α8 LIGHTit +α9 INCOMit 
+εi+νt+ωit , 
where FATAL and ACCI represent any of the two dependent variables in 
prefecture i and year t.. α represents the regression parameter. 
ε i ,ν t andω it represent the unobservable specific effects of the 
individual effects of i „s prefecture (a fixed effect prefecture vector ) in t th year (a 
fixed effect time vector) and error term respectively.  The structure of the data 
set used in this study is a panel;εi holds the time invariant feature. We control it 
by means of fixed effects estimation.  A macro economic condition will be 
captured inνt and we incorporate each year‟s dummy variables to restrain the 
time specific effects.       
     Table 1 includes variable definitions, means, and standard deviations.  
Each variable is discussed as follows.  Dependent variables are both fatalities 
and non-fatal accidents3. Independent variables are defined similar to those used 
by Loeb (1990) and Garbacs and Kelly (1987); real revenue of the car inspection 
industry, alcohol consumption, real per capita income, and the population of 20-24 
year olds4.  If the coefficients of INSP are positive, then the results support the 
offsetting behavior hypothesis.  We use instrumental variables to break the 
endogeneity of the real revenue of car inspections5. 
Several control variables complete the model.  The population density 
represents the difficulty of driving.  The speed of driving partly depends upon the 
circumstances of the road, i.e.,, the road being so crowded that drivers cannot 
drive at high speeds.  Further, low-speed driving is not likely to incur serious 
accidents.  Nonetheless, it seems to be more difficult for drivers to avoid minor 
collisions in denser areas even when driving carefully.  The number of policemen 
is taken as the value for formal enforcement for deterring dangerous driving.  
The number of traffic lights is taken as a means of decreasing accidents as traffic 
lights help to coordinate the traffic system.      
The cost of committing a crime depends on the social norms, which are 
shaped by local interactions (Funk, 2005).  Individuals are apt to drive 
dangerously due to the decrease in the expected cost of committing a crime if the 
                                                   
3 Most previous research has considered only fatalities, except for Merrell et al. 
(1999). 
4 We take the real revenue of the car inspection industry as a proxy variable for 
the degree of car inspection.  Note that some key variables, such as the price of 
medical care or automobile repair, cannot be obtained. Our fixed effects model, 
however, attenuates the omitted variable bias. 
5 Instrumental variables are the number of pedestrian crossings and its square. 
community is disorganized and social norms are weak.  According to Putnam 
(2000), social disorganization is regarded as the engine of bad behavior. Such 
disorganization undermines the social norms and marks urban areas where 
population turnover is high, one‟s neighbors are anonymous, and local 
organization is rare.  DISORG1 is the number of immigrants from other 
prefectures and DISORG2 represents the number of residence changes within a 
prefecture.  We consider these variables to be the proxy for social disorganization 
in order to capture the extent of population turnover and the decrease in the cost 
of committing a crime.  
 
III. RESULTS 
    Table 2 presents the results of the estimations, in which the key results are 
those for INSP and its coefficients in the fatal accidents model of column (1), 
which shows positive but not statistically significant results. Nonetheless, the 
coefficient sign of the 2sls model in column (2) dramatically changes to negative 
and is statistically significant at the 1% level.  Let us turn now to the non-fatal 
accident model in both columns (3) and (4), in which the coefficients are positive 
and statistically significant, which suggests the presence of offsetting effects.  In 
summary, these results imply that automobile inspections are effective in 
reducing vehicle fatalities but not non-fatal accidents. 
    BOOZE is positive in every case but only statistically significant in the fatal 
accident model.  DENS is negative in the fatal model but positive in the non-fatal 
model, and it is statistically significant in columns (1), (3), and (4).  These results 
are consistent with our hypothesis.  
     Results for the fatal models in column (1) suggest that both DISORG 1 and 
DISORG 2 are positive but that only DISORG 1 is statistically significant, at 5%.  
In column (2), using the 2sls model, DISORG 1 and DISORG 2 are positive and 
their values are larger than those in column (1), while being statistically 
significant at the 1% level.  These results imply that the more disorganized the 
community, where social norms are fragile and the cost of committing a crime is 
lower, the more fatal accidents increase.  The non-fatal equation finds the 
coefficient for DISORG 1 and DISORG 2 to be positive though not statistically 
significant.  Thus the cost of committing the crime of a non-fatal accident is 
considered to be lower, and therefore the disorganization effects are weaker.     
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
     One of innovations of this paper lies in its controlling of the endogeneity of 
inspection.  The results of the estimation using the 2sls fixed effects model 
presented here suggest that automobile inspections are effective at reducing 
fatalities but not effective at reducing non-fatal accidents.  Another innovation is 
the incorporation of the factor of social disorganization and the enforcement of 
norms into the estimation model.  The more disorganized the community, the less 
robust the enforcing norm becomes.  Due to the fragility of the enforcement of 
norms, the cost of committing a crime stemming from social sanctions from 
neighbors decreases.  Hence,  disorganized communities will induce drivers to 
drive more dangerously and thereby incur more mortal crashes.   
In conclusion, we found evidence supporting the hypothesis that 
automobile inspections and the enforcement of norms play critical roles in 
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